Crisis Management during the Kennedy Administration

The CIA thinks that support material began to make it in Cuba in earlySeptember, with missiles arriving somewhat later (Pachter, 1963).

sensitiverange Soviet missiles in Cuba did not constitute a threat to the US. The Administration, however, felt that longrange Soviet missiles in Cuba did pose a threat to American cities, although very "few American experts . . . feared" that the Soviets would threaten American cities (Pachter, 1963, p. 7). Although the Kennedy Administration claimed that Soviet arbitraterange missiles in Cuba were capable of destroying every major urban center in the United States, most informed opinion patently did not agree (Pachter, 1963). Even Aviation Week (1962), a periodical strongly supportive of national defense issues, stated that the Soviet missiles should be called not IRBMs (intermediaterange ballistic missiles), exactly PRBMs (politicalrange ballistic missiles). President Kennedy (1962, p.

898), however, said that the missiles "would rent appeared to" change the strategic balance, and that "appearances contribute to reality."

Domestic politics in the US also provided an issue during the Cuban missile crisis. The touch and the Republicans in 3 Congress were, in September 1962, accusive President Kennedy of inaction and indifference in the face of a Soviet military buildup near to the US (Pac

11. UN Ambassador Stevenson: Stevenson was an advocate of disengagement.

crisis and the component of law. New York: Oxford University

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